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Abstract 
Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
December 2001, it has participated in a relatively small number of cases 
brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), contrary to the many 
wild predictions made prior to entry.  In the first few years post-accession, 
China seemed content to act as a passive observer, participating mainly as 
a third party.  However, since 2006, there appears to have been a shift in 
attitude with China now taking a more combative stance, particularly in the 
past few years.  This article will examine China’s participation in the WTO 
DSB from 2002 to date to explore whether China’s approach really has 
shifted from that of passive observer to that of an active participant, 
possible reasons to explain this transformation and what the implications of 
such a shift may be for other WTO Contracting Parties. 
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1. Introduction 
It is clear that dispute settlement is viewed as one of the central pillars of the WTO 
multilateral trading system and the WTO itself claims it is “the WTO‟s unique contribution to 
the stability of the global economy,” and that it “makes the trading system more secure and 
predictable.”1  However, prior to China‟s WTO accession in December 2001, concerns were 
raised that China‟s membership could bring a flood of bilateral trade disputes to the DSB and 
dispute settlement was thus seen as an area of key importance in China‟s accession 
negotiations.  
Why was China‟s participation in the WTO dispute settlement system judged to be so 
crucial?  Firstly, it is clear that “the WTO‟s dispute settlement mechanism is widely regarded 
as the jewel in the crown of the Uruguay Round and the very heart of the WTO.”2  As a 
result, the efficient functioning of the dispute settlement system, including the willing 
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participation of key WTO Members, is essential for the future of the world trading system.  In 
addition, there are continued concerns about the low levels of participation by developing 
countries in the dispute settlement system.  It is obvious that, “the system will survive and 
flourish only if all (or at least a vast majority) of its Members feel that they have the ability to 
adequately protect their WTO rights.”3  China, as one of the largest developing country 
Members in the WTO, can offer important lessons and guidance for other developing 
countries seeking to increase their participation in dispute settlement.  Finally, China‟s 
participation in the WTO dispute settlement system can act as “an important source from 
which to track China‟s transition to full WTO membership.”4   
China formally entered the WTO on December 11th 2001 and from that date is 
subject to all the agreements that make up the WTO including the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).  Since China‟s WTO accession in 2001, its interactions with the world 
trading system have shown a marked shift from an initial focus on amending domestic 
legislation in order to comply with WTO rules and disciplines, to a more assertive stance.  It 
is this shift and the associated implications for China‟s trading partners which is the focus of 
this article. 
This article will be organised into four sections: firstly, the predictions which were 
made prior to China‟s accession in 2001 will be examined; then, China‟s actual pattern of 
interaction with the WTO DSB from 2002-2011 will be outlined to see if these predictions 
materialised.  Thirdly, the pattern which emerges from these disputes will be considered and 
explained in more detail.  The final section will then consider how this pattern of interaction 
may affect China‟s future interactions with the DSB and the consequences for other WTO 
Contracting Parties. 
                                                 
3
 Christopher C. Parlin, "Operation of Consultations, Deterrence, and Mediation," Law and Policy in 
International Business 31, no. 3 (2000): 572. 
4
 Chad P. Bown, "China's WTO Entry- Antidumping Safeguards and Dispute Settlement," NBER Working 
Paper No. 13349 (2007): 32. 
3 
 
2. Predictions of China’s Impact on the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System  
Prior to WTO accession, there was a chorus of warnings of a flood of China-related 
complaints being brought to the DSB immediately upon entry.
5
  It was even feared that this 
torrent of complaints could “overwhelm the already overburdened system”6 and bring the 
DSB to a standstill.  There were a number of factors that led observers to fear a deluge of 
formal WTO complaints against China.  It was clear that it would not be easy for China to 
fully comply with its WTO obligations immediately upon accession, not only because the 
expectations of the international community were so high, but also because China had agreed 
to various onerous „WTO-plus‟ commitments surpassing the minimum commitments 
required.
7
  For example, China agreed to a transitional safeguard clause in the Protocol of 
Accession which makes it much easier for other Members to impose restrictions on imports 
from China, as proof of only „market disruption‟ is required rather than serious injury.8 
Secondly, there were several economic factors that were held to correlate positively 
with increased interaction in the dispute settlement system, namely: “China‟s size, its trade 
surplus with the USA and the EU and the dual nature of its economy.”9  Logically, previously 
studies have found that the number of actual disputes a Member country is involved in is 
directly related to the amount of trade a country undertakes.
10
  As China‟s share of current 
world trade is significant to say the least, it is a logical consequence that China would also 
feature in a large number of WTO disputes. 
China‟s share of global trade has expanded significantly since the start of the reform 
and opening-up period in 1978, beginning “relatively slowly in the 1980s after the relaxation 
of pervasive and complex import and export controls, but accelerat[ing] in the 1990s with 
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broader trade reforms, including significant tariff reductions.”11  Indeed, as China‟s share of 
global trade began to grow in the 1990s, bilateral tensions with trading partners such as the 
US escalated.  For example, in the 1990s, the US grew increasingly impatient at the slow 
pace of reforms in the field of intellectual property (IP) protection and consequently 
threatened massive sanctions under Section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974 in 1991, 1994 and 
1996.
12
  On each occasion, an Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 
which China promised further improvements in the IP system was reached at the last minute, 
but this destructive cycle of threatened unilateral sanctions and forced concessions was 
heavily criticised.
13
  Not only did it lose credibility for the US, but it also stirred up 
resentment among the Chinese.  Therefore, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was seen 
as a more credible and sustained alternative to resolve the existing trade tensions. 
Additionally, there were thought to be geo-political factors which made the initiation 
of formal complaints against China more likely.  Specifically, “foreign governments wary 
that the trade giant is stealing market share”14 may be susceptible to domestic pressure to 
pursue China to the WTO dispute settlement body.  A further political factor hotly debated 
prior to WTO accession was the virtually simultaneous entry of Taiwan to the WTO as a 
separate customs territory.  As the first major international organisation of which both China 
and Taiwan were full members, the WTO provides a platform for cross-straits differences to 
be debated at an international level.  It was feared that, “as Beijing and Taipei appear to be 
constantly obsessed with political concerns that override trade considerations, both parties are 
likely to politicize the use of the dispute settlement mechanism at the cost of effectiveness as 
well as the credibility of the procedures.”15 
However, despite widespread concerns about the impact of China‟s accession on the 
WTO‟s dispute settlement mechanism, the predicted flood of formal complaints failed to 
materialise.  The next section will briefly give an overview of China‟s participation in the 
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dispute settlement system from 2002 to date, both as a complainant, as a respondent and also 
as a third party. 
6 
 
3.  China’s Participation in Dispute Settlement 2002-
2011
16
 
Given China‟s share of world trade, it might be expected that China‟s involvement in 
the DSB would be comparable to the US or the EU.  However, it is clear from Table 1 below, 
illustrating how China‟s involvement with the WTO DSB compares to other selected WTO 
Members, that China‟s formal involvement in disputes, particularly as a complainant, is far 
less than may have been expected from the predictions made in the preceding section.  
China‟s changing participation in these disputes from accession to date will be considered in 
more detail below.  
Table 1: Selected WTO Members’ Involvement in the DSB, 2002-2011 
 
WTO Member As complainant 
(1995-to date) 
As respondent 
(1995-to date) 
As complainant 
(2002-2011) 
As respondent 
(2002-2011) 
China / / 8 21 
Chinese Taipei / / 3 0 
Brazil 25 14 8 2 
India 19 20 6 7 
Korea 15 14 9 3 
Japan 14 15 5 3 
Mexico 21 14 11 7 
US 97 113 28 57 
EU 83 70 27 37 
 
3.1  Cautious Beginnings, 2002-2005 
Contrary to the wild predictions made prior to China‟s WTO entry outlined in the 
previous section, China‟s initial interactions with the DSB were somewhat limited.  China‟s 
first dispute brought as a complainant was in 2002; however, this case (DS252- regarding 
safeguard measures that the US had imposed on steel imports) had eight co-complainants and 
China did not really take a leading role in the dispute.  The result of the dispute was never 
really in doubt as the worldwide media had been fairly united in condemning the US and 
furthermore, every safeguard measure which had been challenged up until that point had been 
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declared inconsistent with WTO principles.
17
  Therefore, China could safely „piggy-back‟ on 
the strong team of co-complainants and the outcome “was arguably a by-product of the legal 
efforts undertaken by more active WTO members in the case such as the EU.”18 
Subsequently, China‟s first real experience with the DSB came in 2004 when China 
was the respondent in a dispute brought by the US over VAT imposed on integrated circuits.  
China continued to show a cautious attitude in this case, possibly because it still “viewed the 
initiation of legal disputes as synonymous to the break-up of diplomatic relations with the 
other countries.”19  As a result, China was quick to settle this dispute through negotiations 
and a mutually agreed solution was notified to the WTO in October 2005.  In addition, other 
trade disputes which arose during this period were also resolved through bilateral 
negotiations instead of through the formal dispute settlement process provided by the WTO.  
For example, the EC threatened to bring a WTO case against China in 2004 over its export 
restrictions on coke; China soon capitulated and restored the existing export levels rather than 
defend the restrictions at the WTO.
20
  China also backed down in late 2005 when the US 
threatened to bring a formal WTO case over its antidumping determination regarding 
linerboard.
21
 
However, in stark contrast to China‟s reluctance to get involved with formal WTO 
disputes as a complainant or respondent immediately after acceding to the WTO, China 
proved keen to get involved with many disputes as a third party.  As can be seen in Figure 1, 
China has been actively involved in a large number of WTO disputes as a third party from 
2002 onwards.  In particular, it joined a large proportion of the cases brought to the WTO in 
2002-6 as a third party, whereas such involvement has dropped off somewhat in recent years, 
as China has become more formally involved in disputes both as a complainant and as a 
respondent. 
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Figure 1- China's involvement in WTO disputes, 2002-2010 
 
 
Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 2, not only has China participated in a large 
number of disputes as a third party, but it has also participated as a third party more 
frequently than almost any other WTO Member over the period 2002-2011. 
 
Table 2: Selected WTO Members’ Involvement as a Third Party, 2002-2011 
 
WTO Member Involvement as Third Party 
(2002-2011) 
China 74 
Chinese Taipei 56 
Brazil 48 
India 36 
Korea 39 
Japan 61 
Mexico 39 
US 43 
EU 63 
 
This enthusiasm for participating in disputes as a third party is in sharp contrast to China‟s 
initial reluctance to bring a formal dispute to the WTO on its own behalf; a reluctance which 
started to shift following the filing of a flurry of cases against China. 
9 
 
3.2  The Gloves Come Off, 2006-2007 
A shift in China‟s relationship with the WTO DSB appears to have begun in 2006 
with the initiation of a formal complaint against China regarding certain measures affecting 
imports of automobile parts (DS339, DS340 and DS342).  This complaint was brought by the 
relative WTO heavyweights of the EC, the US and Canada.  In contrast to China‟s 
conciliatory stance during the trade disputes of 2004-5, China refused to concede during 
consultations and took the dispute to a full panel report.  The panel held in July 2008 that 
China had discriminated against imported car parts and thus represented China‟s first legal 
defeat at the WTO.
22
  China appealed against certain elements of the panel‟s report, but the 
appellate body upheld the panel findings and China subsequently agreed to modify the 
disputed measures in order to comply with its obligations under the GATT 1994.  However, it 
is significant that whilst the panel process was ongoing, China could benefit from keeping the 
disputed measures in place and this may be a consideration in future disputes as China as 
respondent decides whether to settle quickly or take the dispute to a formal panel report. 
The auto-parts complaint was followed in February 2007 by a complaint brought by 
the US and Mexico over measures granting refunds, reductions or exemptions from taxes 
(DS358 and DS359).  The complaint alleged that these measures acted as export subsidies or 
import substitution subsidies for the manufacturing sector prohibited under WTO rules.  
Following extensive consultations, an agreement was reached and notified to the WTO in 
December 2007.  In this dispute, China appeared to be unhappy with the speed at which the 
establishment of a panel was requested, whilst consultations and legal amendments were still 
being undertaken.   
 Given the publicity surrounding China‟s poor intellectual property enforcement,23 it is 
perhaps surprising that China had not been the respondent in a case involving compliance 
with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) before 
2007, but on 10
th
 April 2007, the US finally circulated two related requests for consultations 
with China.  The first of these (DS362) concerned measures affecting trading rights and 
distribution services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products such as 
movies, DVDs, videos, publications or books.
24
  The second (DS363) concerned measures 
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affecting the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
25
  China‟s reaction to 
the initiation of these WTO complaints was strenuous denial and disappointment that the US 
had deemed this action necessary.
26 
Overall, the focus of the United States‟ submission was on fairly minor procedural 
aspects of the intellectual property system in China.  Several of the grounds for complaint 
may simply have arisen from imprecise language in the primary legislation, such as the doubt 
over whether prohibiting illegal reproduction and distribution includes illegal reproduction or 
distribution only.  Consequently, this reflects the problem of bringing a complaint to the 
WTO DSB in general; as distinguishing compliance from non-compliance is a largely 
subjective process, a complainant requires evidence of systemic failures not just complaints 
about inadequate law enforcement.
27
  Nevertheless, the panel report for dispute DS362 
largely supported the US and to date, China has made good progress towards implementing 
the report‟s recommendations for legislative amendments.28  In DS363, although the panel 
report was circulated in August 2009, China and the US both appealed certain findings and 
the Appellate report was completed in December 2009, which found that some specific 
measures were inconsistent with China‟s WTO obligations. China has now amended most of 
the disputed measures in line with the panel‟s recommendations. 
Following these disputes being brought against China, China finally initiated a dispute 
on its own merits, rather than „piggybacking‟ on an existing dispute as had been the case in 
the steel safeguards dispute of 2002.  In September 2007, China requested consultations with 
the US regarding determinations of anti-dumping and duty for coated paper from China 
(DS368).  The dispute raises important questions about China‟s status as a non-market 
economy and the calculation of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
29
  However, this 
dispute was short-lived as the US‟ preliminary trade restriction was never formally 
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imposed.
30
  Nevertheless, it seems that China‟s taste for bringing disputes to the DSB was 
undiminished by this misfiring as will be seen in the next section. 
3.3  Fighting Fire With Fire, 2008-2011 
 Since the start of 2008, China‟s involvement with the WTO DSB has escalated; with 
China facing seven disputes as a respondent
31
 and initiating six disputes as a complainant.  
This arguably shows the maturing of China‟s interactions with the DSB as China is more 
willing to utilise the multilateral legalistic mechanisms available, rather than seeking to avoid 
the dispute settlement process.  Of these thirteen disputes, there also appears to be a clear 
distinction between the issues on which China is willing to concede during the consultation 
period and those which China is more determined to take to a full panel hearing.  These latter 
issues predominantly concern anti-dumping measures and other restrictions on what China 
regards as key export industries. 
3.3.1 Disputes settled through consultations 
 The first dispute in which China was involved in as a respondent in this period 
involved measures affecting financial information services and foreign financial information 
suppliers.  The complainants were the EU (DS372), the US (DS373) and Canada (DS378), 
alleging that China was restricting market access to news services through the official Xinhua 
news agency, clearly an area of some political sensitivity in China.  However, an agreement 
was swiftly reached in this dispute, with China agreeing to allow foreign financial 
information suppliers to set up commercial operations in China.
32
 
 The second of the disputes to be settled through consultations concerned grants, loans 
and other incentives and consisted of three separate requests for consultations by the US, 
Mexico and Guatemala received in December 2008/January 2009.
33
  This dispute related 
specifically to subsidies which China was allegedly providing to domestic enterprises under 
the China World Top Brand Programme and the China Famous Export Brand Programme 
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contingent upon meeting export performance criteria.  Following extensive consultations, 
China agreed to end the disputed subsidies in December 2009.
34
   
 Finally, China faced a request for consultations brought by the US concerning its 
subsidies for enterprises manufacturing wind power equipment, which the US alleged to 
favour domestic over imported goods.
35
  The dispute was initiated in December 2010, but by 
June 2011, China had agreed to end the disputed subsidy program.
36
  The swift resolution of 
these three disputes within the consultation period may suggest that China recognised that 
they were in breach of their WTO obligations, or that the disputes did not concern key 
industries or exports which China considered worthwhile defending to a full panel hearing, in 
stark contrast to the following set of disputes. 
3.3.2 Disputes taken to panel proceedings 
 Eight of the thirteen disputes involving China since 2008 have not been resolved 
through consultations and have been taken to panel proceedings.  Four of these involve anti-
dumping measures, an issue which is of paramount importance to China.  China is 
consistently the most frequent target of EU anti-dumping investigations
37
 and is also unhappy 
with many of the anti-dumping determinations carried out by the US.  In September 2008, 
China launched a dispute against the US (DS379) relating to anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on certain products from China, including pipes, pneumatic tyres and woven sacks.  
Consultations proved fruitless and a panel was established in January 2009, with the panel 
report issued in October 2010 and the Appellate Report in March 2011 and subsequently 
adopted.  A particular point of interest for China was the US determination that state-owned 
enterprises in China (SOEs) were classed as „public bodies‟.  This dispute also strikes at the 
heart of US trade policy whereby, since March 2007, China can be treated as a non-market 
economy in anti-dumping determinations but as a market economy under countervailing duty 
law;
38
 this inconsistency was at the heart of China‟s WTO complaint.   
In addition to this dispute with the US, China has also initiated two anti-dumping 
related disputes against the EU recently.  Both of these concern anti-dumping measures 
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imposed on Chinese exports: iron and steel fasteners in the first instance (DS397) and 
footwear in the second (DS405).  China is concerned that there may be procedural 
irregularities in the EU‟s determination of dumping and has also voiced concerns about its 
status as a non-market economy (NME) and the implications this has for anti-dumping 
determinations.
39
  China scored a partial victory in the panel report regarding the dumping of 
fasteners with the panel finding the EU‟s anti-dumping measures were inconsistent with it‟s 
WTO obligations.  However, this dispute is currently being considered by the Appellate Body 
and panel proceedings are still in progress for the footwear dispute. 
The fourth recent dispute involving anti-dumping measures was brought by the US 
against China and concerns measures imposed on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel 
(DS414).  The issue could not be resolved through consultations and a panel was composed 
to consider the dispute in May 2011.  In addition to these anti-dumping disputes which have 
already reached the stage of full panel hearings, China is embroiled in two other anti-
dumping disputes which are still at the consultation stage.  DS407 was brought by the EU in 
May 2010 over the issue of anti-dumping measures imposed on iron and steel fasteners, 
essentially a tit-for-tat complaint responding to DS397 brought against the EU by China in 
July 2009 concerning dumping of exactly the same products.
40
  The final  anti-dumping 
dispute which is still ongoing (DS422) involves anti-dumping measures imposed by the US 
on imports of warm water shrimp from China and consultations are still ongoing on this issue. 
 Apart from disputes involving anti-dumping measures imposed on key exports which 
China appears determined to pursue to a full panel stage, China has also been involved in 
disputes in which China seems unwilling to back down.  The first of these dealt with the 
exportation of raw materials filed in June 2009 by the US and the EU.
41
  Mexico later joined 
the dispute in August 2009.
42
  The raw materials in question, such as coke, bauxite, fluorspar, 
magnesium, silicon metal, and zinc are key elements for the global chemical, steel and 
aluminium sectors and the complainants alleged that China was restricting their export in 
order to benefit domestic enterprises.  Nevertheless, China responded that the restrictions in 
place were necessary for environmental conservation
43
 and refused to concede during 
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negotiations;  thus, a single panel was composed to consider the dispute in March 2010 with 
panel hearings still ongoing. 
2009 also brought the initiation of two more disputes against the US:  DS392 
regarding measures affecting imports of poultry from China and DS399 regarding imports of 
certain passenger vehicle and light truck tyres from China.  The first dispute, initiated in 
April 2009, concerns a US ban on poultry imports from China, contrary to a 2004 
commitment from the US to allow trade in poultry products to resume following the bird flu 
outbreak.
44
  The second dispute, launched in September 2009, dealt with increased tariffs on 
tyres imported from China, which China argues are not justified as a safeguard mechanism 
because the US has failed to prove the necessary „market disruption‟ as required in Article 16 
of China‟s Protocol of Accession.  In both disputes, consultations were inconclusive and both 
disputes were resolved by panel reports.  Finally, China is also the respondent in a dispute 
(DS413) brought by the US regarding the alleged monopoly that China holds over its 
electronic payment services in contravention of WTO commitments under the GATS 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services). 
Overall, China is emerging as a tenacious opponent in the WTO dispute settlement 
system, particularly in the anti-dumping arena or in disputes where key exports are at stake, 
such as footwear or poultry.  China is no longer willing to meekly concede when challenged 
by a powerful trade partner such as the US or EU and could be thus be said to have matured 
as a WTO Member.  On the whole, it seems clear that China‟s pattern of interaction with the 
WTO DSB has shifted from extensive third-party involvement, to reluctant participation as a 
respondent, to enthusiastic use as a complainant in the years since accession.  The next 
section will consider possible reasons for this shift in dispute settlement participation. 
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4.  Explaining China’s Pattern of Interaction with the WTO 
DSB 
 There are various explanations why China has shifted from a reluctant respondent to a 
more enthusiastic litigator within the WTO dispute settlement system.  The first of these is 
that there is thought to be a cultural preference amongst East Asian Members for dispute 
resolution through negotiation.  This reluctance has been stated as merely reflecting the “East 
Asian cultural aversion to open conflicts and legal settlements” as they “still cling to their 
non-litigious tradition of the past.”45  Some commentators have even gone further, claiming 
that China may even view the launching of a formal complaint against it as a failure of 
preferred techniques of bilateral consultation.
46
  Indeed, it is notable that none of China‟s 
WTO disputes to date have involved another East Asian WTO Member.  Rather, intra-
regional trade disputes have been resolved via negotiated deals, such as the Shiitake 
mushrooms dispute between China and Japan of 2000-1 and the laver import quota dispute 
between Japan, China and Korea in 2004-6.
47
 
 The concept of „aggressive legalism‟ may be relevant here: that is the strategy of 
utilizing international legal rules as both
 „sword‟ and „shield‟ at the same time in trade 
disputes between
 
sovereign nations, which was first coined in 2001 to describe a similar shift 
in Japan‟s attitude to WTO trade dispute resolution. 48   However, it would perhaps be 
premature to label China‟s litigation strategy as aggressive legalism; at best, it could currently 
be described as “assertive legalism”49 as China begins to bring more complaints to the WTO 
DSM (dispute settlement mechanism) to be resolved.  Another concept which may also be 
useful in explaining China‟s DSB participation shift is that of selective adaptation.  Selective 
adaptation describes a process by which international norms and practices are accepted and 
assimilated into local conditions
50
 and is increasingly relevant as the globalization of 
international laws and legal institutions continues apace.  Indeed, it has been noted that “the 
WTO‟s Dispute Resolution Understanding, particularly its provisions for binding decisions 
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by dispute resolution panels, reflects liberal norms of legal institutionalism.”51  As these 
liberal norms may be dissimilar to domestic Chinese norms, it is obvious that a period of 
adjustment may be necessary. 
 Selective adaptation would also imply that institutional capacity within China would 
be crucial for the local implementation of international norms
52
 and indeed, many 
commentators have noted China‟s lack of capacity in the dispute resolution mechanism as 
one of the main hurdles to full participation.
53
  This lack of expertise in WTO law has been 
addressed by China‟s enthusiastic participation in WTO disputes as a third party, particularly 
in the first few years post-accession.  This participation was seen as a valuable means of 
“learning WTO litigation and enhancing its legal expertise (including training its trade 
officials and Chinese international trade lawyers), rather than as a means of addressing its 
trade concerns.”54  A further step that China has taken in closing the resource gap is to 
develop better relations with the private sector, for example, enhancing the role of trade 
associations in identifying foreign trade barriers which may be inconsistent with WTO law,
55
 
which can be an important tool in initiating disputes in other WTO Members. 
However, although this mooted cultural preference for harmony and resolution of 
disputes through negotiation rather than litigation, as well as a lack of institutional capacity, 
may partially explain China‟s reluctance to initiate formal disputes with trading partners, it 
clearly cannot also explain the reluctance of China‟s key trading partners to bring trade 
disputes to the WTO.  A benevolent view is that WTO Members wanted to give China a 
grace period within which to reform without the pressure of WTO dispute procedures.  The 
hiatus between China‟s accession and first formal dispute taken to a full panel report in 2006 
could be said to be a „honeymoon period‟ for China in the WTO.  In effect, this could be due 
to “trading partners… willing to give China some leeway in light of its recent accession”56 
and also in recognition of the huge changes that were required in order to bring China in 
compliance with its WTO obligations.  In China‟s Protocol of Accession and associated 
documents, several commitments featured a phase-in period of several years; for example, 
some non-tariff mechanisms such as import quotas were to be eliminated immediately upon 
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accession, whilst for some products, such as automobiles, the phase-in period lasted until 
2005.  Thus, it is perhaps the case that China‟s trading partners did not initiate a formal 
dispute against China whilst the main five year transition period was continuing, but once this 
was completed, China was viewed as a „mature‟ WTO Member and thus liable to be taken to 
the DSM if not seen to be playing by the WTO‟s rules.  This was explicitly stated in a Top-
to-Bottom review of US-China trade policy carried out in February 2006 by the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR).
57
 
Alternatively, it is also true that many Members felt that the possible risks from a 
dispute with China may have outweighed the eventual benefits from winning the case: “Many 
potential petitioners have realised they have such extensive business dealings in China in 
other areas that they cannot risk antagonising an important business partner.  The potential 
threat to other areas of business if the Chinese retaliate in some way is too great a risk to 
take.”58  This fear of retaliation may also extend beyond the level of the individual WTO 
Members down to the individual businesses operating in China who do not wish to complain 
to their governments for fear of retaliation from Chinese officials.
59
 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that political factors play an undeniable role 
in the initiation and timing of WTO disputes.  Thus, disputes brought against China, 
particularly by the US, cannot be divorced from broader political considerations such as 
pressure from Congress.
 
 For instance, the historic change in control of Congress from the 
Republicans to the Democrats after the 2007 mid-term elections led directly to a stronger 
offensive against China and the initiation of several new WTO disputes with China as 
respondent, as well as several pieces of new proposed legislation which could have serious 
consequences for trade with China.
60
  This hardened stance against China is “primarily driven 
by domestic groups and Congress, which deem America‟s large trade deficit with China to be 
the result of Chinese „unfair trade practices‟.”61  However, clearly not all areas of potential 
dispute are subject to WTO jurisdiction; for example, the valuation of the Chinese yuan is 
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one area which continues to cause conflict with trade partners yet is not defined as a trade 
barrier by the WTO.   
The impact of the global financial crisis of the past few years also cannot be ignored 
as a potential cause of the recent upsurge in dispute settlement activity involving China.  It is 
clear that “China‟s role on the global stage has grown to be even more significant amid the 
recent financial crisis,” 62  with some countries using the „credit crunch‟ as an excuse to 
increase protectionism at the expense of China.  In fact, China has been the targeted the most 
frequently by „crisis-era protectionism‟; “In the past 12 months China‟s commercial interests 
have been hit 146 times by protectionist measures,” 63  but China has also responded by 
introducing protective state measures of its own.  This could be partly responsible for the 
recent increase in disputes taken to the WTO DSB, particularly in relation to the anti-
dumping disputes.  
Therefore, there are a variety of factors which taken together can help to explain 
China‟s pattern of interaction with the WTO dispute settlement system since accession in late 
2001.  There may be some merit in the argument that China, along with other East Asian 
nations, simply prefers to resolve disputes through negotiation rather than litigation and this 
argument is supported by the lack of formal disputes between Asian WTO Members in 
general.  However, it is more likely that China‟s initial reluctance to formally bring disputes 
to the WTO arose from a lack of experience in WTO litigation and the necessary institutional 
capacity rather than an innate cultural preference.  This lack of experience was largely 
addressed through extensive third party participation in the first few years following 
accession. 
Once China had gained the necessary experience, it began to participate more actively 
both as a respondent but also as a complainant.  This coincided with increased activity from 
China‟s trading partners such as the US, responding to domestic pressure and the end of 
China‟s five-year WTO transition period, to initiate more formal complaints.   The recent 
upsurge in complaints brought to the WTO could reflect the recent global financial crisis and 
consequent increase in trade barriers as countries retreat to protectionism.  In particular, 
China has been the target of a huge number of anti-dumping investigations and as a result, 
has brought three complaints to the WTO in the past two years involving determinations of 
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anti-dumping.  This focus on anti-dumping in China‟s disputes could also be because it “is a 
horizontal issue that affects multiple industries over a long period of time.”64  This could also 
explain why China is more willing to settle some disputes (such as the dispute over the 
provision of financial information news) than others which involve trade policies of vital 
strategic importance. 
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5.  Lessons to be Learnt from China’s Interactions with 
the WTO DSM 
China‟s observed pattern of interaction with the WTO dispute settlement system may 
also have important implications both for the WTO itself and for key trading partners.  It is 
clear that “a dispute settlement system to which a large majority of WTO Members do not 
have any realistic access cannot claim to be an effective system,”65 so China‟s reluctant initial 
participation in the DSM would be disquieting to say the least.  In general, it is extremely 
worrisome that developing countries feel that resource and monetary constraints preclude 
their full use of the dispute settlement system,
66
 and this may be symptomatic of a wider 
imbalance in the WTO as a whole between industrialised Western nations and poorer 
developing countries.  Specifically, the dispute settlement system “does not give weaker 
countries the same protection that well developed legal systems usually afford their weaker 
citizens.”67 
In 2003, China itself proposed placing limits on cases brought against developing 
country Members of the WTO, including limiting the number of cases to two which may be 
brought by a developed country Member against a developing country Member in any 
calendar year; forcing the developed country Member to pay the costs of the developing 
country Member if they bring a case against a developing country Member and lose; and 
shortening the time frame for dealing with anti-dumping disputes.
68
  This shows the defensive 
attitude of China at the time, clearly viewing the initiation of any formal WTO dispute as a 
letdown and may signal the need for greater assistance, both monetary and expertise, for 
developing country Members when dealing with the WTO DSM. 
A further lesson may be the use of third party participation in disputes as a tool to 
learn about WTO litigation more generally.  Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 and 
was quick to join two disputes as a third party, before swiftly launching its first complaint 
against the US in February 2010.  As the complaint against the US regarding anti-dumping 
measures on shrimp from Vietnam is very similar to Thailand‟s successful case against the 
US which Vietnam had joined as a third party, it is clear that Vietnam may well have gained 
the confidence to launch their own dispute by participating in the previous dispute as a third 
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party.  China clearly adopted this strategy of using third party participation as a learning tool 
in order to build legal capacity in the years immediately following accession and it may be 
useful for other new Members, such as Ukraine and Tonga who have yet to join a dispute 
even as a third party, to adopt a similar strategy.   
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from China‟s more recent involvement 
in WTO disputes is the obvious contrast between issues where China has conceded relatively 
quickly during the consultation period and issues where China is more willing to take the 
dispute to full panel proceedings.  Generally, the latter disputes concern anti-dumping 
determinations and other measures which may impact upon what China regards to be key 
industries or exports.  Therefore, trading partners initiating a complaint against China in one 
of these key areas should be prepared for the long-haul as China is unlikely to concede during 
consultations. 
Overall, China‟s recent increased utilisation of the WTO dispute settlement forum is 
to be welcomed; it shows that the DSM is fulfilling its role of diverting bilateral disputes 
which could previously have spilled over into outright trade war.  However, it‟s apparent that 
the recent economic downturn and associated rise in protectionist trade barriers may lead to 
even more China-related cases being brought to the WTO DSB and it will be interesting to 
how China reacts especially if panel reports are not favourable to Chinese arguments.  It may 
pose a strong test of China‟s commitment to international legal institutions and their rules. 
6. Conclusion 
 China‟s interactions with the WTO dispute settlement body have clearly undergone a 
seismic shift from accession in 2001.  The first few years saw extensive third party 
participation, from which China gained expertise in WTO litigation, but few formal disputes.  
This changed in 2007 after China‟s five-year transition period ended and China began to be 
seen as a mature Member; this also coincided with domestic US political changes which led 
to greater pressure to pursue trade disputes with China more aggressively.  Recently, China 
has initiated several disputes against both the EU and the US, showing a more assertive 
attitude to the dispute settlement system.  The wider use of the WTO DSM is to be applauded 
as China and key trading partners are using the neutral legal mechanism provided by the 
WTO to resolve disputes which could otherwise escalate and cause real resentment.  This 
shows that China‟s policy of „peaceful rise‟ appears to be beneficial in the field of 
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international trade disputes and it will be interesting to see if this continues in the future as 
further credit crunch-linked trade barriers continue to target China. 
